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3 
 
Introduction 
 
In order for civilized nations such as the United States to enjoy peace and economic 
stability, it is essential that the current government have the authority to settle disputes that may 
arise between entities that do not enjoy an alignment of values. It is the responsibility of all 
levels of government to make rulings that promote civil rights and liberties with an emphasis on 
the well-being of the general public. Nowhere is this more evident than in the realm of 
competition and misalignment of goals that exists between organized labor and capitalistic 
employers. While organized labor’s goals are often concerned with job security, pay increases, 
fringe benefits, safety standards, and/or representational rights, employers of all types are more 
likely to be concerned with controlling costs and maximizing a business’s bottom line. While in 
a perfect world, labor unions and corporations would be willing to work together to achieve 
mutual benefits, it is no surprise that their goals often stand in stark contrast to one another.  
 
Historical Context  
 
 Labor unions are not a creation of the American capitalistic society. Organized labor 
dates as far back as the late fourteenth century in the form of guilds in the Flemish cloth industry 
(Munro, 2000).  The precursor to modern-day labor unions was a group of all male workers 
known as “fullers” and when the Count of Flanders tried to enact policies of wage reduction, 
they went on strike. This ultimately led to a labor agreement under which only half of the 
originally proposed wage cut was enacted. Collective bargaining was born. Despite their very 
primitive origins in the Flemish clothing industry, workers guilds would ultimately develop into 
the modern-day labor unions that possess great amounts of bargaining power and political 
influence. As democracy began to take hold in some of the World’s largest countries, labor 
unions that sought to preserve the safety and financial stability of the individual worker became 
increasingly popular. Nowhere did workers banding together for mutual gain play a bigger part 
in the economy than in the young American colonies. In his book Labor in America: A History, 
Melvin Dubofsky says that the first “trade societies” in America were made up of both skilled 
and journeymen workers who performed jobs such as “carpenters and masons, shipwrights, and 
sail makers, as well as tanners, weavers, shoemakers, tailors, smiths, coopers, glaziers, and 
printers.” These workers had three basic goals: higher wages (or at least the preservation of 
current wages), shorter hours, and improved working conditions (Dubofsky, 2004). These early 
trade societies sought to attain these goals largely through peaceful demonstrations, particularly 
strikes. As time went on, union power and membership underwent a cyclical increase in 
influence that tended to trend upward during times of prosperity and downward during more 
difficult economic times.  
For the majority of U.S. history, the story has been the same. Unions strove to gain 
political influence so they might tip the scales of power in their favor, while capitalist 
entrepreneurs sought to use their monetary resources to limit the influence that unions could 
have. The fact that unions were slowly but surely gaining ground was evident. In 1913, President 
Taft signed a bill that made the Department of Labor a cabinet department (Columbia, 2011). 
This was evidence of the progress that organized labor was making in America. Due to the large 
number of labor disputes that were taking place in the industrial sector, on July 5, 1935, 
President Franklin Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act into law (2011). As the 
“primary law governing relations between employers and employees in the private sector,” the 
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NLRA established the National Labor Relations Board to handle disputes between the two 
parties (2011). The National Labor Relations Act, also known as the Wagner Act, guaranteed the 
“rights of labor to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice” 
(Columbia, 2011). Essentially, the Wagner Act protected employees from union busting 
activities by employers and established that workers did indeed have a basic right to collectively 
bargain. This was a major gain for workers because they had for so long been at the mercy of the 
legal system that tended to favor corporate interests over workers’ rights. Critics of the Wagner 
Act claimed that it gave too much power to union leaders. There were a large number of bills 
that sought to modify the provisions of the Wagner Act that either died in Congress or were 
vetoed by the President. It wasn’t until 1947, that a piece of legislation was successfully passed 
that significantly modified the statutes set forth in the Wagner Act. In 1947, Congress passed the 
Labor-Management Relations Act (Columbia, 2011). More widely known as the Taft-Hartley 
Act, the Labor-Management Relations Act included some provisions that swung the pendulum of 
power back toward corporate interests, and put a damper on some of the practices that unions 
were able to utilize. Due to the fact that national crises (particularly war) tended to force 
governmental and corporate organizations to concede to unions’ demands when strikes were 
implemented during times of dire need for industrial output, the Taft-Hartley Act gave the 
federal government the right to “obtain an 80-day injunction against any strike that it deemed a 
peril to national health or safety” (2011). While this indeed may have been a necessary 
provision, it is easy to see why union members saw this as an infringement upon their basic 
rights. Another provision in the law that drew criticism from union supporters was the fact that 
the Taft-Hartley Act outlawed the “closed shop” (2011). The closed shop is a labor term for 
when an organization employs only members of the organization’s representing labor union. 
This type of setup gave union leaders a lot of power over their members because belonging to a 
labor union was a condition of employment in these types of establishments. The Taft-Hartley 
Act also limited the “union shop” to only being permitted if a majority of employees voted in 
favor of it. The union shop refers to establishments in which employees can be hired regardless 
of whether they are union members or not, but they must join a union within a certain amount of 
time to keep their jobs (2011). One result of these two provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act has had 
a lasting effect on the economy of the United States for the past 65 years. As a result of the Taft-
Hartley Act being passed, there was a push by business leaders and conservative leaning 
politicians to pass “Right-To-Work” laws on a state to state basis. These laws prohibit requiring 
an employee to join a union at anytime during their employment, essentially outlawing the union 
shop. In addition to outlawing the union shop, RTW laws also outlawed the “agency shop.” The 
agency shop referred to some establishments that did not require union membership as a 
condition of employment, but did require employees to pay the standard union membership dues. 
According to the National Right-To-Work Legal Defense Foundation’s website, twenty-three 
states have now passed some form of right-to-work legislation (2012). The proponents of these 
laws believe that individuals should have the right-to-work without being forced to become a 
member of an organization whose beliefs and values may not be aligned with those of the 
individual worker. Opponents of these amendments contend that RTW laws undermine the 
ability of workers to organize for collective bargaining and allow for individuals to become 
freeloaders, receiving benefits that unions have fought for without paying dues. People who are 
in favor of RTW laws contend that these laws are friendly to business, allow business owners to 
operate freely without giving an inordinate amount of power to union bosses, and ultimately 
promote higher levels of employment in those states. Opponents of these laws disagree with 
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these points, contending that workers in right to work states suffer lower standards of living, 
weaker union representation, and lower wages than workers in other states. The purpose of this 
research is to look at statistics and the actual effect of right-to-work laws when put into practice 
in order to determine if workers and businesses in Arkansas are indeed better off as a result of 
Arkansas becoming a right-to-work state.   
 
Background Information 
 
With the passage of Taft-Hartley, states gained the ability to amend their constitutions to 
outlaw the union shop and the agency shop if they so chose. Chart 1 shows when the respective 
right-to-work states enacted their various laws. The most recent of these states to go RTW is 
Indiana, which enacted its constitutional amendment on February 1
st
, 2012 (Davey, 2012). Figure 
1 is a map of the RTW states.  
 
Chart 1: Right-To-Work States by Year of Adoption 
 
State Year of RTW Passage State Year of RTW Passage 
Florida 1943 Alabama 1953 
Nebraska 1947 South Carolina 1954 
Arkansas 1947 Utah  1955 
Georgia 1947 Kansas 1958 
Iowa 1947 Mississippi  1960 
North Carolina 1947 Wyoming  1963 
South Dakota 1947 Louisiana 1976 
Tennessee 1947 Idaho 1986 
Virginia 1947 Texas 1993 
Arizona  1947 Oklahoma 2001 
North Dakota 1948 Indiana 2012 
Nevada 1951 
   
Figure 1: Right-To-Work State Map 
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Review of Past Studies  
 
While opponents and supporters may be set in their opinions as to whether or not RTW 
laws are a good thing, previous studies are conflicting at best. Richard Vedder (2010) attributes 
increases in population growth, as well as annual growth in average wage rates to right-to-work 
laws, citing union monopolies for keeping the marginal labor cost above marginal revenue for 
employers. He asserts that this imbalance is more easily dissolved in right-to-work states as a 
result of less union power. However, Lonnie Stevans, (2009) contends that while right-to-work 
states have a higher number of businesses and self-employment, capital formation, employment 
and personal income are either not-statistically different, or lower (in the case of personal 
income) in right-to-work states . His study determined that while proprietors’ income is higher in 
right-to-work states, “there appears to be little “trickle-down” to the largely non-unionized 
workforce in these states”. He also notes that bankruptcies are more common in right-to-work 
states than in non-right-to-work states. Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute did a 
study in 2001 on right-to-work laws and wages that partially controlled for cost of living 
differences between states. He found that when controlling for a variety of factors, workers in 
right-to-work states earned a statistically significant 3.8% less than their non-right-to-work 
counterparts (Mishel, 2001). Emin Dinlersoz and Ruben Hernandez-Murillo (2002) did a study 
on manufacturing growth in Idaho before and after its passage of right-to-work laws and while 
they did determine that decreased unionization led to an increase in manufacturing growth, it was 
inconclusive whether or not they could attribute the decreases in union membership to right-to-
work laws. One particularly interesting study was done by Robert Krol and Shirley Svorny 
(2007). Their paper Unions and Employment Growth: Evidence from State Economic Recoveries 
concluded that stronger unions due in part to a lack of right-to-work laws in some states 
negatively affected states’ ability to increase employment after periods of economic recession 
(2007).  
  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
This paper will look at the impact that right-to-work laws have had on certain economic 
statistics that are viewed as major economic indicators. These economic indicators are a good 
indication of the current state of the economy. Time series data for these statistics will provide 
reviewers with a look at how right-to-work states have fared versus non-right-to-work states over 
the past decades. The economic indicators that will be taken into account are the unemployment 
rate, the labor force participation rate, population growth rates, and average wage rate growth.  
 The chief criticism that proponents of unions make of right-to-work legislation is that 
laws outlawing the closed shop reduce a union’s ability to retain membership and add new 
membership. As a precursor to addressing whether or not right-to-work laws have a significant 
effect on the economic performance of states, one must first determine whether or not states with 
right-to-work laws actually do have lower rates of union membership. If this is not the case, then 
the arguments about whether or not right-to-work laws have a negative impact on union 
membership, thereby affecting a state’s economy, are questionable at best.  
 When taking union participation rates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and analyzing this data with SAS Enterprise Guide software, it 
quickly becomes clear that right-to-work states have much lower union membership than states 
without right-to-work laws. As you can see in Chart 2, during the period from 1989 to 2010 the 
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percentage of workers who were union members was always higher on average in states without 
right-to-work laws. The differences in these two means were statistically significant for every 
year observed. This is also true for the proportion of employee’s who have union representation 
as seen in Chart 3. These employees may or may not be members of their place of employment’s 
union, but they pay dues and receive union representation just the same as regular members. 
These means are also significantly higher in non-right-to-work states.  
 
Chart 2: Union Membership  
(Non-RTW, RTW, and Arkansas) 
 
Year  Non-RTW (%)  RTW (%)  
Equality of 
Variance T-Calc Significance Sig Diff?  
Arkansas 
(%)  
1989 18.06 10.17 0.0258 6.3 <.0001 Yes* 9.7 
1990 17.81 9.83 0.011 6.62 <.0001 Yes* 10.3 
1991 17.88 9.79 0.0106 6.71 <.0001 Yes* 10.2 
1992 17.4 9.71 0.0156 6.32 <.0001 Yes* 8.6 
1993 17.18 9.51 0.0086 6.34 <.0001 Yes* 8.3 
**1995 17.2 8.74 0.2143 6.91 <.0001 Yes* 7.8 
1996 16.75 8.5 0.2168 6.96 <.0001 Yes* 7.1 
1997 16.18 8.07 0.0741 6.64 <.0001 Yes* 5.9 
1998 16.14 7.93 0.0266 7.79 <.0001 Yes* 6.2 
1999 16.14 8.19 0.4298 7.15 <.0001 Yes* 7.5 
2000 15.6 7.7 0.0742 7.2 <.0001 Yes* 5.8 
2001 15.6 7.72 0.0638 7.78 <.0001 Yes* 6.5 
2002 15.53 7.38 0.0042 7.34 <.0001 Yes* 5.9 
2003 15.29 6.85 0.0052 8.64 <.0001 Yes* 4.8 
2004 14.78 6.7 0.0021 8.28 <.0001 Yes* 4.8 
2005 14.99 6.5 0.008 8.14 <.0001 Yes* 4.8 
2006 14.57 6.61 0.014 7.91 <.0001 Yes* 5.1 
2007 14.57 6.67 0.0162 7.73 <.0001 Yes* 5.4 
2008 15.03 6.68 0.0482 7.94 <.0001 Yes* 5.9 
2009 14.9 6.65 0.0209 7.75 <.0001 Yes* 4.2 
2010 14.26 6.52 0.0383 7.65 <.0001 Yes* 4 
*99% Confidence Level          ** Data was not available for 1994  
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Chart 3: Union Representation 
(Non-RTW, RTW, and Arkansas) 
 
Year  
Non-RTW 
Rep (%)  
RTW - 
Rep (%)  
Equality of 
Variance  T-Calc  Significance Sig Diff  
Arkansas 
Rep (%)  
1989 20.09 12.67 0.1203 5.22 <.0001 Yes* 12.1 
1990 20.03 12.33 0.071 5.39 <.0001 Yes* 12.1 
1991 19.9 12.3 0.0661 5.42 <.0001 Yes* 12.5 
1992 19.41 12.05 0.0681 5.28 <.0001 Yes* 11 
1993 19.09 11.87 0.0311 5.71 <.0001 Yes* 10.4 
**1995 18.97 10.77 0.5432 6.62 <.0001 Yes* 9.7 
1996 18.35 10.51 0.6287 6.37 <.0001 Yes* 8.4 
1997 17.81 9.89 0.4535 6.17 <.0001 Yes* 6.8 
1998 17.55 9.68 0.0946 6.78 <.0001 Yes* 7.3 
1999 17.64 9.75 0.508 6.83 <.0001 Yes* 8.6 
2000 17.15 9.37 0.1921 7.04 <.0001 Yes* 6.8 
2001 17.13 9.32 0.1043 7.42 <.0001 Yes* 8.1 
2002 16.84 8.95 0.0165 7.49 <.0001 Yes* 6.7 
2003 16.65 8.41 0.031 8.24 <.0001 Yes* 5.9 
2004 16.08 8.22 0.0117 7.94 <.0001 Yes* 6.2 
2005 16.23 7.96 0.027 7.88 <.0001 Yes* 6 
2006 15.82 7.94 0.0849 7.22 <.0001 Yes* 6 
2007 15.93 8.05 0.1046 7.35 <.0001 Yes* 6.5 
2008 16.53 8.12 0.1411 7.87 <.0001 Yes* 7.3 
2009 16.37 8.04 0.0765 7.48 <.0001 Yes* 5 
2010 15.58 8.02 0.0876 6.88 <.0001 Yes* 5.4 
* 99% Confidence Level        ** Data was not available for 1994  
 
It is worth noting that the two states that adopted right-to-work laws during the time period from 
1989 to 2010 (Texas in 1993 and Oklahoma in 2001) did not experience drastically lower rates 
of union membership in the following years. Both states have experienced falling union 
membership rates as the years have gone on, but this trend of decreasing union membership is 
not unique to these states. As you can see in Graph 1 below, falling unionization rates is a trend 
that is shared by right-to-work states and non-right-to-work states alike. This has been going on 
since union membership peaked in 1954 at 35% of the nonagricultural employment (Dubofsky, 
2010). It is hard to infer from the data whether or not right-to-work legislation lowers union 
participation or if states that have low union participation have values or prevailing ideologies 
that make them more likely to pass right-to-work laws. There is a bit of the chicken and the egg 
effect that is going on here that makes establishing causality difficult, but we can unequivocally 
say that right-to-work states have lower unionization rates than their counterparts. 
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Graph 1 Union Membership and Representation Rates 
(Non-RTW, RTW, and Arkansas) 
 
 
 
Easily one of the most scrutinized and talked about economic statistics is the 
unemployment rate. The unemployment rate, in short, measures the percentage of the labor force 
participants that are unable to find jobs. More specifically, the unemployment rate is the 
percentage of unemployed workers divided by the total number of workers in the labor force. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the labor force consists of workers who are non-
institutionalized, over the age of sixteen, and are currently employed or if unemployed, have 
actively looked for work in the past four weeks. Not surprisingly, this statistic spends a large 
amount of time in the spotlight as politicians, policy makers such as the federal reserve board of 
governors, organized labor leaders, and employers offer their advice  as to how to minimize the 
unemployment rate and shield workers from the negative effects of the business cycle.  
Individuals who are in favor of right-to-work laws will contend that the increased 
influence that unions are privy to in non-right to work states result in wage floors (in the form of 
legislated minimum wages, union contracts, etc.) that create a mismatch between the supply of 
and the demand for labor. They would contend that unemployment in non right to work states 
could be partially attributed to those states’ labor laws. Richard Vedder of the Cato Institute for 
Economic Analysis, contends that his statistical analyses have been able to attribute lower 
unemployment rates to right-to-work legislation. He points out in his article Right-To-Work 
Laws: Liberty, Prosperity, and Quality of Life that in 2007, right to work states had an average 
unemployment rate of 4.04%, while non-right-to-work states averaged 4.58% unemployment. 
These arithmetic means are good descriptive statistics for an overview of current conditions in 
right-to-work states and non-right-to-work states, however more work needs to be done to this 
data to determine if these differences are indeed statistically significant and if so, whether or not 
they can be attributed to differences in labor laws.  
When using SAS Enterprise Guide, a data mining program, to analyze the difference in 
means between unemployment data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, it can be 
determined that Right-To-Work States do typically enjoy lower unemployment rates than their 
0
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non-right-to-work counterparts. However, using the ANOVA t-test for mean function of SAS 
produces results that are inconclusive to say the least. As evidenced by Table 3, right-to-work 
states had lower unemployment rates than their non-RTW counterparts from 1976 to 1985 and 
from 1990 to 2011. Right-to-work states had higher unemployment rates from 1986 to 1989. 
However, the differences in average unemployment rates were not statistically different for every 
year from 1976 to 2011. Right-to-work states had statistically lower unemployment during the 
time periods of 1976 to 1980 and from 1991 to 1996 evaluated at the 95% confidence level. If 
confidence standards are relaxed, we can be 90% sure that right-to-work states had lower 
unemployment during the years 1981, 1997, 2003, 2006, and 2008. The inconclusive part of this 
statistical analysis is that from 1982 to 1990, 1998 to 2002, 2004 to 2005, 2007 and 2009 to 2011 
the unemployment rates of right-to-work states and non-right-to-work states had no statistical 
difference in their means.  
The focal point of this paper is the effect of right-to-work laws on the economy of the 
state of Arkansas. The statistical results mentioned in the previous paragraph indicate at least on 
the surface that right-to-work laws indeed have a positive effect on individual states’ efforts to 
minimize unemployment. However, for Arkansas the results are not as positive. During the time 
period of 1976 to 2008 Arkansas averaged a higher unemployment rate than both right-to-work 
states and non-right-to-work states in general with the exception of 1993 when Arkansas’s 
unemployment was lower than the mean unemployment rate in states without right-to-work laws. 
These results are easily seen if you will take a look at Graph 2 below and Chart 4 on the next 
page. On the positive side, it is worth noting that Arkansas’s unemployment rate actually fell 
below national unemployment rates for both non-right-to-work states and right-to-work states 
during the economic downturn during 2009 and 2010. This information is consistent with the 
findings of Robert Krol and Shirley Svorny whose economic analysis of unions and their effects 
on economic growth concluded that “union influence is linked to slower job growth during 
economic recoveries” (2007). Arkansas continued to have a relatively low unemployment rate in 
2011 despite the poor national economy, with an 8% unemployment rate versus 8.32% 
unemployment in non-right-to-work states and 7.97% unemployment across all right-to-work 
states. This appears to bode well for Arkansas’s economic outlook in the foreseeable future.  
 
Graph 2: Unemployment Rate by State 
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Chart 4: Unemployment Rates 
(Non-RTW, RTW, Arkansas) 
 
Year 
Non-RTW 
(%)  
RTW 
(%)  Equality of Variance T-Calc  Significance  Sig Diff?  
  Arkansas 
(%)  
1976 7.67 6.11 0.2534 3.04 0.0038 Yes 6.8 
1977 7.02 5.85 0.3932 2.73 0.0087 Yes 6.4 
1978 6.04 4.98 0.9232 2.73 0.0089 Yes 6.2 
1979 5.88 4.82 0.9713 2.95 0.0049 Yes 6.1 
1980 7.24 6.11 0.2579 2.62 0.0118 Yes 7.4 
1981 7.62 6.69 0.8532 1.8 0.0785 No* 8.5 
1982 9.45 8.74 1 1.08 0.2857 No 9.3 
1983 9.38 8.8 0.7177 0.82 0.4172 No 9.8 
1984 7.49 6.93 0.6123 0.9 0.3742 No 8.3 
1985 7.06 7.05 0.6441 0.03 0.9796 No 8.5 
1986 6.8 7.12 0.9307 -0.49 0.6254 No 8.5 
1987 6.02 6.45 0.7588 -0.72 0.4775 No 8.1 
1988 5.29 5.7 0.6936 -0.77 0.4443 No 7.7 
1989 5.1 5.19 0.9749 -0.23 0.8228 No 7 
1990 5.62 5.09 0.743 1.63 0.11 No 6.8 
1991 6.88 5.72 0.8493 2.86 0.0062 Yes 7.2 
1992 7.33 6.12 0.9653 2.82 0.0069 Yes 7.1 
1993 6.72 5.64 0.8264 2.74 0.0086 Yes 6.1 
1994 5.9 5.17 0.9672 2.07 0.0433 Yes 5.3 
1995 5.51 4.8 0.5563 2.1 0.0405 Yes 4.8 
1996 5.42 4.74 0.3859 2.06 0.0446 Yes 5.1 
1997 4.99 4.33 0.2563 1.99 0.0524 No* 5.1 
1998 4.57 4.07 0.1184 1.57 0.1238 No  5 
1999 4.23 3.93 0.0946 1.04 0.3033 No 4.5 
2000 3.95 3.79 0.2926 0.63 0.5318 No 4.2 
2001 4.6 4.37 0.8114 0.91 0.3656 No 4.7 
2002 5.49 5.17 0.9549 1.11 0.2723 No 5.3 
2003 5.81 5.31 0.5201 1.69 0.0972 No* 5.8 
2004 5.37 4.93 0.3142 1.53 0.1332 No 5.6 
2005 5.02 4.76 0.4453 0.87 0.3903 No 5.1 
2006 4.66 4.14 0.4295 1.81 0.0762 No* 5.3 
2007 4.6 4 0.7687 2.2 0.0323 Yes 5.3 
2008 5.61 4.96 0.255 1.86 0.0683 No*  5.4 
2009 8.77 8.08 0.1844 1.25 0.2174 No 7.5 
2010 8.99 8.44 0.0514 0.97 0.3384 No  7.9 
2011 8.32 7.97 0.0219 0.58 0.5647 No 8 
* Not Statistically Significant at 95% Confidence Level, but Statistically Significant at 90% Confidence Level  
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 While the unemployment rate is a useful statistic for getting a general idea of the state of 
an area’s economy, it is important to keep in mind that it is not the “be-all end-all” statistic that 
many in the public tend to make of it. The unemployment rate is most informative when taken in 
conjunction with the labor force participation rate. The labor force participation rate is a 
measurement of the total number of individuals who are in the labor force (both employed and 
unemployed) divided by the total number of the given area’s citizens who are over sixteen and 
non-institutionalized. The reason the labor force participation rate is so important is because the 
unemployment rate is at its core, a flawed statistic. The unemployment rate is flawed because it 
fails to take into account individuals who have been unsuccessful in finding work and have given 
up searching for a job. These “discouraged workers” are not technically “unemployed”, but they 
are certainly casualties of a less than optimal economy. In order to reinforce or weaken the above 
conclusions that right-to-work states have statistically equal unemployment rates as non-right-to-
work states, and may in fact have lower unemployment rates, labor force participation must be 
considered. Based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, SAS statistical analysis reveals 
that during the time periods 1976 to 2011, right to work states and their counterparts had 
statistically equal labor force participation. From 1976 to 1993, non-right-to-work states had 
higher labor force participation, but as previously stated, the differences in averages was not 
statistically significant. However, since 1994 right-to-work states have had higher labor force 
participation. It is worth noting that in 1993, Texas passed right-to-work legislation. This may 
account for the turning point where right-to-work states began to have higher average labor force 
participation. This can be observed in Graph 4 below. Much like it did with respect to the 
unemployment rate, Arkansas does not fare as well as much of the nation. During the past 35 
years, Arkansas has consistently had lower labor force participation than both the right-to-work 
states and states without right-to-work laws. As you can see in Graph 3 and Chart 5, Arkansas’s 
labor force participation has been approximately 4-5% below the national average during this 
time period, following the national trend with startling parallelism, but at a significantly lower 
rate.  
 
Graph 3: Labor Force Participation Rate 
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Chart 5: Labor Force Participation Rate 
(Non-RTW, RTW, Arkansas) 
 
Year Non-RTW (%) RTW (%)  
Equality of 
Variance T-Calc Significance  Sig Diff?    Arkansas (%)  
1976 62.72 62.29 0.3213 0.4 0.689 No 57.7    
1977 63.31 63.15 0.383 0.14 0.8858 No 58.6    
1978 64.1 63.62 0.4672 0.46 0.6502 No 58.7    
1979 64.69 63.94 0.3402 0.7 0.4846 No 59.5    
1980 64.86 64.14 0.3272 0.67 0.507 No 59.5    
1981 64.91 64.39 0.5487 0.46 0.6454 No 60.6    
1982 65.03 64.55 0.7647 0.42 0.6763 No 60.2    
1983 65.14 64.53 0.8484 0.55 0.5854 No 59.8    
1984 65.58 64.87 0.7884 0.62 0.5394 No 60.1    
1985 65.9 65.47 0.7593 0.38 0.7073 No 60.3    
1986 66.26 66.04 0.4217 0.2 0.8445 No 60.8    
1987 66.58 66.18 0.424 0.35 0.7252 No 61.5    
1988 66.83 66.31 0.4423 0.47 0.6427 No 62.1    
1989 67.37 66.69 0.5086 0.6 0.5501 No 62.8    
1990 67.66 66.97 0.6255 0.65 0.5161 No 63.2    
1991 67.4 66.79 0.6618 0.57 0.572 No 62.3    
1992 67.55 67.05 0.6414 0.47 0.644 No 63.0    
1993 67.42 67.14 0.9272 0.25 0.807 No 63.2    
1994 67.52 68.01 0.6465 -0.43 0.6706 No 64.3    
1995 67.5 68.08 0.5717 -0.5 0.617 No 64.3    
1996 67.62 67.97 0.5764 -0.31 0.76 No 64.2    
1997 67.93 67.9 0.6735 0.03 0.9792 No 63.3    
1998 67.98 67.92 0.8705 0.06 0.9548 No 62.9    
1999 65.11 65.25 1 -0.12 0.9047 No 60 
2000 65.42 65.37 0.6624 0.05 0.9593 No 59.8 
2001 64.81 64.53 0.507 0.25 0.8041 No 58.2 
2002 63.66 63.64 0.3837 0.01 0.9902 No 59 
2003 63.27 63.49 0.513 -0.19 0.8528 No 57.3 
2004 63.22 63.67 0.4024 -0.4 0.688 No 58.5 
2005 63.62 63.95 0.3424 -0.31 0.7608 No 61 
2006 64.02 64.41 0.2462 -0.35 0.728 No 60.1 
2007 63.87 64.5 0.0715 -0.56 0.5787 No 59.7 
2008 63.16 63.81 0.0268 -0.56 0.5787 No 59.7 
2009 60.49 60.75 0.0341 -0.19 0.8492 No 57.4 
2010 59.7 59.8 0.1238 -0.08 0.9364 No 55.3 
2011 59.7 59.86 0.108 -0.12 0.9056 No 55.3 
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 Population growth is another important statistic that must be factored into any analysis of 
an area’s economic well-being. During the last 30 years, the population of the United States as a 
whole has increased from 226,545,805 to 308,745,538, an increase of 36.3%. During that same 
time period, Arkansas’s population has grown from 2,286,435 to 2,915,918 or an increase of 
27.5%. While Arkansas has not kept up with the nation’s average population growth, it has fared 
better than many of its counterparts, some of whom have even had decades in which they 
experienced negative population growth. This is important for a state’s economy because as a 
population ages, in order to maintain standards of living and steady economic growth, there must 
be a younger generation entering the work force to continue the trend of economic growth 
increasing output and tax revenue.  
 In his paper, Right-To-Work Laws: Liberty, Prosperity, and Quality of Life, Richard 
Vedder maintains that population growth in right-to-work states has outpaced growth in non-
right-to-work states because right-to-work states “allow greater personal liberty with respect to 
employment” (2010). Whether this is the case or not remains to be seen. Census data coupled 
with statistical analysis using SAS reveals that right-to-work states have indeed outpaced their 
counterparts in terms of growth rate. However, the first decade of our analysis did not provide 
significant indications that right-to-work laws were having a positive effect on population 
growth. During the interval between 1980 and 1990, right-to-work states experienced an average 
growth of 10.6% compared to growth of 8.16% among states without right-to-work legislation. 
However, this difference was not statistically significant. During that same time period, Arkansas 
experienced growth of a mere 2.8%. The 1980-1990 decade did little to cast right-to-work laws 
and particularly, Arkansas’s decision to pass them, in a positive light. However the following 
two decades were drastically different. As population growth increased across the nation, non-
right-to-work states grew at a rate of 10.04%. While this was impressive compared to the 
previous decade, right-to-work states far surpassed their counterparts by growing at a rate of 
18.34% through this ten year stretch. Furthermore, this difference was statistically significant at 
the 98% confidence level. Not only that, but Arkansas grew faster than the average non-right-to-
work states, with a 13.7% growth rate. The 1990s were very kind to right-to-work states in 
general, and while Arkansas did not keep up with the average in that category, it grew at a higher 
rate than the non-right-to-work states did. The first decade of the 21
st
 century proved to be more 
of the same. Non-right-to-work states grew at a rate of 7.03% but were once again outpaced by 
the states with right-to-work laws, which grew by 13.36% on average during the decade. This 
difference was also statistically significant at the 99% level. Arkansas experienced respectable 
growth of 9.1%, once again growing faster than the average state without right-to-work laws. 
The analysis results described above are summarized in Chart 6 below.  
 
Chart 6: Population Growth Rates 
(Non-RTW, RTW, Arkansas) 
 
Time 
Period Non-RTW RTW 
Equality of 
Variance  T-Calc  Significance  Sig Diff?  Arkansas 
80-90 8.16 10.6 0.0358 -0.67 0.5069 No  2.8 
90-00 10.04 18.34 0.0003 -2.4 0.0236 Yes* 13.7 
00-10 7.03 13.36 0.0044 -3.18 0.0033 Yes* 9.1 
    * 95% Confidence  
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Methodology 
 
 Another question is whether or not this establishes right-to-work laws as a factor of 
causation that has a positive effect on population growth. When analyzing Census Department 
data with SAS, the results indicate that right-to-work laws have indeed had a positive effect on 
population growth during the past two decades. Simple regression however, can be improved 
upon. The most glaring trait that one notices when looking at the map of right-to-work states on 
page 5 is that most right-to-work states are in the South and West portions of the country, with a 
glaring lack of right-to-work states in the Northeastern United States. As Vedder notes in his 
analysis, “many of the right-to-work states are located in the Sun Belt, and, other things equal, 
many Americans prefer sunny warm climates to cold, damp ones” (2010). U.S. migration and 
population patterns show that there has been a trend of people moving further south and west in 
recent history. To account for this when doing SAS analysis, the growth rates of states were 
matched up with a dummy variable with a value of 1 indicating that a state is one of the 25 
southern-most states and a value of 0 indicating a state from the northern half of the country. 
This coding was determined by grouping the states by how far south they were in terms of 
average latitudinal coordinates. It was expected that the variable for southern states and right-to-
work laws would be highly correlated, but this was not the case, with a correlation coefficient of 
approximately of 0.4. It is also worth noting that in the regression models where population 
growth during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s respectively, are the dependent variables, states that 
adopted right-to-work laws during that time (Idaho, 1986: Texas, 1993: Oklahoma 2001) were 
omitted from the analysis during the decade in which they adopted these laws. This is in keeping 
with what Lonnie Stevans did in his study of right-to-work laws in 2009.  
 
Results 
 
 Regression models using Census data reveal that right-to-work laws did not have a 
significant effect on population growth from 1980 to 1990. The model’s R2 in Chart 7 indicates it 
is a pretty good fit, explaining roughly 59% of the variation in population growth. The regression 
results indicate that instead of right-to-work laws, a better predictor of population growth would 
simply be the state’s relative geographical location. Relative geographic location had a 
significant, positive effect on population growth in the 80s. On average, the twenty-five 
southern-most states experienced a population increase of 7.7% greater than that of the 25 
northern most states over this 10 year period with a standard error of the coefficient estimate of 
2.565. As one might expect, other large drivers of population growth were the increase in GDP, 
the average unemployment rate, and the average labor force participation rate from 1980 to 1990. 
All of these variables had a statistically significant effect on population growth and surprisingly, 
none of the independent variables in this study were highly correlated with one another. The 
independent variable with the largest impact on population growth after the variable denoting 
geographic sector was the average unemployment rate variable. Not only was this variable 
significant, but surprisingly the sign for the coefficient was a positive 2.8 with a standard error of 
.94. This indicates that for every 1% higher the average unemployment rate in a state was during 
that time period, the population growth was 2.8% higher average This is a surprising result 
indeed, but it may be explained by frictional unemployment. This is a type of unemployment that 
is caused by individuals leaving their jobs because they want to look for another one or they are 
moving to another area. It makes logical sense that states experiencing higher growth rates would 
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be experiencing higher rates of frictional unemployment. Other significant drivers of population 
growth include the average labor force participation rate with a regression coefficient of 1.77 and 
a corresponding standard error of 0.38446. This makes sense because individuals moving from 
state to state would be more likely to move to states with an abundance of jobs. The same is true 
for couples deciding to have children. The more people that an area can manage to keep 
employed, the more likely couples are to decide to have children, further contributing to the 
population growth. Unfortunately, while the variable denoting right-to-work states has a positive 
coefficient, it is not statistically significant at any substantial confidence level. Unfortunately for 
the state of Arkansas, while this model would predict Arkansas’s population to have grown by 
6.56% during this decade, Arkansas’s population actually grew by only 2.8%. However, if one 
has the mindset that since population growth in Arkansas was less than one might expect and 
therefore the economic gains that the state experienced can be distributed among a smaller 
number of Arkansans, then these results do indeed seem positive. This regression analysis leads 
the researcher to conclude that right-to-work laws were not a significant driver of population 
growth in the 1980s and that Arkansas may have actually benefitted because of that.  
 
Chart 7: Regression Analysis Population Growth 1980-1990 
(Dependent Variable: Pop. Growth) 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF 
Sum of Mean 
F Value Pr > F Squares Square 
Model 5 3903.242 780.6484 12.56 <.0001 
Error 44 2735.13 62.16205     
Corrected Total 49 6638.372       
  Root MSE 7.88429 R-Square 0.588   
  Dependent Mean 9.166 Adj R-Sq 0.5412   
  Coeff Var 86.01671       
Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF 
Parameter Standard 
t Value Pr > |t| Estimate Error 
Intercept 1 -151.463 30.3601 -4.99 <.0001 
RTW (1) 80-90 1 1.93556 2.56502 0.75 0.4545 
South 25 1 7.73335 2.64899 2.92 0.0055 
Increase in GDP 80-90 1 0.19205 0.03869 4.96 <.0001 
AVG Unemployment 80-90 1 2.81733 0.94165 2.99 0.0045 
AVG LFPR 80-90 1 1.77248 0.38446 4.61 <.0001 
 
Alternatively, regression analysis reveals a different picture during the decade of the 
1990s. Based on the results of the regression for population growth during the 90s, this research 
can conclude that right-to-work laws did have a significant effect on population growth during 
this time period. This model explained 75% of the variation in population growth among states 
during the 90s as indicated by the R
2
 of the model. Right-to-work states, on average experienced 
a 4.9% greater increase in population that their counter parts did during this decade. Similarly, 
southern states grew on average by 5.7% more during the decade than northern states did when 
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other variables are taken into account. The standard errors for these two estimates are 2.077 and 
2.155 respectively. States experienced a .31% greater population growth on average for each 1% 
increase in GDP over this time period. As in the model for the 1980s population growth, the 
average unemployment rate once again had a positive, significant impact on population growth, 
this time with a 4.89 coefficient and a standard error of 1.2. As in the previous model, this is 
probably attributable to frictional unemployment in high-growth states. The average labor force 
participation variable was also significant, with a parameter estimate of 1.35 and a standard error 
of .358. This indicates that for each 1% increase in the average labor force participation rate 
during the timer period, a state would be predicted to have a 1.35% higher population increase on 
average with all other variables held constant. All parameter estimates can be observed in Chart 
8 below. This model would have predicted a population growth of 15.4% over the decade for 
Arkansas however Arkansas only experienced a population growth of 13.7%. The results of this 
model lead the researcher to conclude that right-to-work laws were indeed a significant factor in 
population growth during the 90s and while Arkansas grew less than expected, that may not be a 
bad thing when the increase in GDP was spread across the state’s economy.  
 
Chart 8: Regression Analysis Population Growth 1990-2000 
(Dependent Variable: Pop. Growth) 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF 
Sum of Mean 
F Value Pr > F Squares Square 
Model 5 4888.177 977.6355 26.41 <.0001 
Error 44 1628.871 37.0198     
Corrected Total 49 6517.049       
  Root MSE 6.08439 R-Square 0.7501   
  Dependent Mean 13.268 Adj R-Sq 0.7217   
  Coeff Var 45.85763       
Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF 
Parameter Standard 
t Value Pr > |t| Estimate Error 
Intercept 1 -131.352 29.18703 -4.5 <.0001 
RTW (1) 90-00 1 4.90205 2.07751 2.36 0.0228 
South 25 1 5.7173 2.15564 2.65 0.0111 
Increase in GDP 90-00 1 0.31509 0.0376 8.38 <.0001 
AVG Unemployment 90-00 1 4.89073 1.20675 4.05 0.0002 
AVG LFPR 90-00 1 1.35136 0.3581 3.77 0.0005 
 
 Based on the regression results from the first decade of the 21
st
 century, it appears that 
right-to-work laws had no effect on population growth during this time period. This regression 
model explained approximately 50% of the variation in the dependent variable, population 
growth from 2000 to 2010. This model is represented in Chart 9 on the next page. Southern 
states experienced GDP growth of almost 8% more on average than their northern counterparts 
during this time period. For every 1% increase in GDP from 2000 to 2010, states experienced 
.15% greater population growth on average (SE = .06). Average unemployment also had a 
positive effect on population growth, again attributable to frictional unemployment. This 
parameter coefficient was estimated to be 2.5 with a standard error of 1.01. The average labor 
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force participation rate was significant, with a coefficient of .866 and standard error of .282. 
Using this model, and excluding all insignificant parameters, Arkansas would be projected to 
growth 17.8% in population from 2000 to 2010. Since Arkansas’s population actually grew by 
9.1% during that time, one must conclude that Arkansas’s residents fared very well, receiving the 
economic benefits of a 50.5% increase in GDP and a 34% increase in average wages during the 
time period. However, the researcher cannot attribute these growths to Arkansas’s right-to-work 
legislation.   
 
Chart 9: Regression Analysis Population Growth 2000-2010 
(Dependent Variable: Pop. Growth) 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF 
Sum of Mean 
F Value Pr > F Squares Square 
Model 6 1292.8 215.4667 7.08 <.0001 
Error 43 1308.053 30.41985     
Corrected Total 49 2600.854       
  Root MSE 5.51542 R-Square 0.4971   
  
Dependent 
Mean 
9.782 Adj R-Sq 0.4269 
  
  Coeff Var 56.38335       
Parameter Estimates 
Variable DF 
Parameter Standard 
t Value Pr > |t| Estimate Error 
Intercept 1 -62.6145 22.7739 -2.75 0.0087 
RTW (1) 00-10 1 2.33686 1.95905 1.19 0.2395 
South 25 1 7.97488 1.96326 4.06 0.0002 
Increase in GDP 00-11 1 0.15053 0.063 2.39 0.0213 
AVG Unemployment 00-10 1 2.50131 1.00603 2.49 0.0169 
AVG LFPR 00-10 1 0.86623 0.28216 3.07 0.0037 
% Increase In HRLY Wage (2000s) 1 -0.27289 0.21225 -1.29 0.2054 
 
While the increase in GDP did have a significant effect on the population growth, the 
increase in hourly wages was not a significant driver of population increases. This would seem to 
indicate that the increase in GDP that created jobs gave a boost to population growth, but those 
newly created jobs were more of an attractive factor for states than increases in wages. This 
could be explained by the fact that right-to-work states and non-right-to-work states experienced 
percentage increases in hourly wages that were statistically the same. Wages (across all 
industries) in right-to-work states increased by 33.28% from 2000 to 2010. Similarly, wages in 
non-right-to-work states grew by 33.26% during that time period. This was not a statistically 
significant difference. Arkansas outperformed both averages, with wages increasing by 34.8% 
during this decade. Since wages grew at roughly the same pace between right-to-work states and 
their counterparts, it makes sense that the majority of population gains in states were motivated 
by job creation. Job creation in turn, was driven by increases in GDP (output) in the right-to-
work states. From 2000 to 2010, GDP grew by an average of 59.6% in right-to-work states 
versus a 47.72% increase in GDP in non-right-to-work states. This difference was significant at 
the 98% confidence level. Arkansas fared pretty well, with its GDP increasing by 50.5% during 
this time span. Arkansas experienced a greater increase in GDP than the average state without 
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right-to-work laws, but as was the pattern, it fell short of the average performance of the 
aggregate of right-to-work states. Based on this, right-to-work appears to have positively affected 
Arkansas’s GDP growth in the first decade of the new millennium.  
 
Conclusion 
 
When looking at the results drawn from the data, there is insufficient evidence to declare 
unequivocally that right-to-work has been good for Arkansas. While right-to-work states have 
been shown to have unemployment rates, labor force participation rates, and average wage 
growth rates that are statistically the same as non-right-to-work states, Arkansas has consistently 
underperformed in these categories. On the other hand, right-to-work states have experienced 
statistically higher population growth and higher GDP growth during the past few decades than 
their right-to-work counterparts. Regression analysis indicates that right-to-work has been 
partially responsible for these discrepancies, and Arkansas has consistently outperformed the 
non-right-to-work state averages during recent years.  
Based on a review of the data analysis employed during the course of this research, and a 
thorough analysis of the corresponding literature based on past studies, it is a conclusion of the 
researcher that right to work laws are more pro economic growth than their non-right-to-work 
counterparts, particularly in the short term. Unfortunately, the state of Arkansas's economy has 
not been privy to all of the improvements in economic stability with which many of the other 
right-to-work states have been blessed. However, this is not to say that Arkansas should repeal 
its right-to-work laws. All of the economic growth that Arkansas has experienced during the 
greater part of the last century has been done with right-to-work laws in effect. Currently, 
Arkansas enjoys lower unemployment, a higher population growth rate, and a higher GDP 
growth rate over the past ten years than non-right-to-work states do on average. The economy of 
Arkansas is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination, but it is performing adequately, and 
when considering the current condition of our nation’s economy, that’s certainly a positive.  
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